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1. Introduction 
During the recent global financial and economic crisis, we have witnessed a certain number of 
most prominent central banks in the world, e.g. the Federal Reserve, the European central bank 
(ECB), the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan, have brought down the discount and funds 
rates to a level near to zero, and massively inject the central-bank liquidity into the money and 
credit markets under what is called quantitative and credit easing policies.  
The monetary policy experience of Japan during the 1990s and 2000s has stimulated a vivid 
interest among economists on the “liquidity trap” in the sense of Keynes, i.e. whatever is the 
quantity of central-bank liquidity injected into the money market, it is absorbed without a 
decrease of the nominal money-market interest rate notably because the latter has encountered the 
zero lower bound (ZLB). The interest has grown larger after the burst of the Internet bubble in 
2000 because many economists doubt that the USA could enter a deflation crisis.  
Various proposals have been advanced to make monetary policy effective in the event of the 
ZLB on nominal interest rates. One widely shared belief among economists is that pre-emptive 
monetary easing is important to minimize the likelihood that interest rates will fall to zero. Studies 
on the issue of pre-emptive monetary easing include, among others, Orphanides and Wieland 
(2000), Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Kato and Nishiyama (2005), Adam and Billi (2006, 
2007), Nakov (2008), and Oda and Nagahata (2008).1 For Benhabib et al. (2002), a route to 
avoiding self-fulfilling liquidity traps is to modify monetary policy, by switching from Taylor rule 
to a money growth rate target letting interest rates be market determined, when the economy 
seems to be headed toward a low-inflation spiral. This change of policy regime may be effective 
when fiscal policy is not Ricardian. Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) and Buiter (2009) have 
proposed the use of Gesell taxes on monetary balances, which can be interpreted as a negative 
                                                 
1 These authors consider the optimal commitment or discretionary policy in terms of interest rate rules using 
three types of theoretical frameworks, i.e. purely forward-looking, purely backward-looking, or “hybrid” 
forward- and backward-looking structural model. 
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interest rate on money, as a way to avoid liquidity traps.2 This point of view is contested by 
Benhabib et al. (2002) who argue that if a liquidity trap is understood as a situation where the 
opportunity cost of holding money (instead of bonds) becomes zero, a Gesell tax clearly does not 
eliminate it but simply pushes the nominal interest rate on bonds at which it occurs below zero.  
Another important consensus among economists is that, when nominal interest rates have 
fallen to zero, “expectations management” which acts on the formation of private-sector 
expectations about future monetary policy is important. A relatively large literature about 
“expectations management” is developed since the work of Krugman (1998), who argues that, 
even when the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB, the central bank could still stimulate the current 
level of output by raising expectations of future inflation.3 Most economists working on the issue 
of interest rate ZLB share this point of view and suggest that the Bank of Japan commits to 
policies that would raise future inflation. However, raising inflation expectations and committing 
to reducing the policy interest rates in the future are not separate issues since it is by committing 
to lower future policy rates that the central bank affects future inflation at the ZLB (Eggertsson 
and Woodford, 2003, 2004; Jung et al., 2005; Adam and Billi, 2006, 2007; Nakajima, 2008; 
Walsh, 2009). Three alternative policy proposals involving a yen depreciation are advanced. The 
first calls for an aggressive base money expansion when the nominal rate reaches zero 
(Orphanides and Wieland, 2000). The second suggests that the central bank switches to an 
exchange rate-based Taylor rule when the ZLB is encountered, with the exchange rate adjusted in 
response to inflation and output gap (McCallum, 2000, 2001). The last proposal, due to Svensson 
(2001, 2003), calls for a depreciation followed by an exchange rate peg and an announced price-
level target. However, these proposals have limited utility if several large economies 
simultaneously enter into a liquidity trap. Altering the composition of assets on the central bank’s 
                                                 
2 Buiter (2009) has made two other proposals, i.e. (1) abolishing currency; (2) decoupling the numéraire from 
the currency/medium of exchange/means of payment and introducing an exchange rate between the numéraire 
and the currency. The exchange rate is set over time to achieve a forward discount or expected depreciation of 
the currency vis-à-vis the numéraire when the nominal interest rate in terms of the numéraire is set at a negative 
level for monetary policy purposes. 
3 Another strand of research on the ZLB has considered Keynesian fiscal stimulus (Posen, 1998; Bernanke, 
2000; Kuttner and Posen, 2001; Seidman, 2001; Benhabib et al., 2002; Lewis and Seidman, 2008). 
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balance sheet offers another potential lever for monetary policy while the effectiveness of such 
policies is a contentious issue (Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004). Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) have 
shown that an open-market purchase of government debt can counteract deflationary price 
tendencies when the ZLB is encountered. Furthermore, the central bank can also alter monetary 
policy by changing the size of its balance sheet through buying or selling securities to affect the 
overall supply of reserves and the money stock. Therefore, even if the overnight interest rate 
becomes pinned at zero, the central bank can still expand the quantity of reserves beyond what is 
required to hold the overnight rate at zero or a very low level. Such policy, commonly referred to 
as “quantitative easing” is experimented firstly in Japan and currently in the United-States, the 
euro zone and the United-Kingdom. 
There is some evidence that quantitative easing can stimulate the economy even when interest 
rates are near zero. The quantitative easing policy that leads to an expansion of the money supply 
at the ZLB will affect the economy as long as the rise in the money supply is expected to persist 
(Sellon, 2003). According to Spiegel (2006), in the case of Japan, the real effects of quantitative 
easing appear to be principally associated with some measurable declines in longer-term interest 
rates.4 These have been associated both with changes in agents’ expectations of future interest rate 
levels and with purchases of “nonstandard” assets, such as longer-term government bonds. Since 
quantitative easing and other unconventional monetary policies often occurred simultaneously, it 
is difficult to discriminate between them.  
The Fed has gone much further down the path of quantitative easing. In particular, it focuses 
on expanding the asset side of its balance sheet in order to lower interest rates on the credit 
markets. In such a policy, compared to what the Fed has traditionally done through the open-
market operations or discount, the range of assets accepted is much broader, they have much 
                                                 
4 The quantitative easing policy aided weaker Japanese banks and generally encouraged greater risk-tolerance in 
the Japanese financial system. This could have positive effects on the real economy in the short-run even though 
the magnitudes of these effects are very uncertain. However, in strengthening the performance of the weakest 
Japanese banks, quantitative easing may have had the undesired impact of delaying structural reform and could 
negatively impact the long term growth. For a review of Japanese experience of zero interest rate policy coupled 
with quantitative easing policy, see Spiegel (2006). 
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longer maturities and the number of financial institutions that have access to the central-bank 
liquidity has been significantly increased following a relaxation of criteria and a change in the 
status of some institutions. The Bank of England, the ECB to a lesser extent, has followed the 
practice of the Fed. Even though market observers initially use the term “quantitative easing”, the 
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke (2009) has preferred to use the term “credit easing”. The difference 
between quantitative easing and credit easing does not reflect any doctrinal disagreement with the 
Japanese approach, but rather the differences in financial and economic conditions between the 
two episodes. The new term allows the Fed Chairman to better communicate with the public on 
unconventional policy measures and to make a difference with a monetary policy involving only 
the injection of central-bank liquidity through the increase of banking reserves.5 Policies which go 
beyond the quantitative easing policy such as buying private-sector credit instruments or lending 
by the central bank have been previously discussed in some studies (Clouse et al., 2003; Sellon, 
2003). However, such policies are not yet discussed in a theoretical framework which clearly 
distinguishes quantitative and credit easing policies.  
We remark that using similar framework as the literature on inflation targeting and interest 
rate rules, theoretical studies about the ZLB on the nominal interest rate do not make explicit the 
links between monetary policy and extremely negative financial and monetary shocks and hence 
are not wholly satisfactory for studying the underlying transmission mechanism of the effects of 
zero interest rate, and quantitative and credit easing policies. Discussions about the quantitative 
easing policy are made generally without using models except Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005), 
while the latter use a framework which cannot be used to discuss how quantitative and credit 
easing policies could interact. Furthermore, most theoretical frameworks do not explicitly 
consider the operating procedure of the central bank by not distinguishing the overnight, longer 
term interbank and credit market interest rates. When discussing about the ZLB on the nominal 
interest rate, most economists talk in effect about the funds rate targeted by the central bank. The 
                                                 
5 When the ZLB is encountered, communication is one of most important instruments available to the central 
bank. Before the current crisis, Bernanke et al. (2004) have shown that there is in the USA some evidence that 
central bank communications can help to shape public expectations of future policy actions. 
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ZLB on the funds rate becomes a problem because we are concerned with the market interest rates 
which can be higher if market operators perceive that the monetary policy of lowering funds rate 
is not sufficient to restore the economic growth and the confidence on the financial markets. 
Hence, it is very important to make the distinction between the funds rate and other market 
interest rates.  
This paper provides a framework where several policies options, such as zero interest rate 
policy, and quantitative and credit easing policies used in the current financial and economic 
crisis, could be simultaneously examined. We extend a New Keynesian framework (Clarida et al., 
1999) to a model of policy analysis with credit, money and reserve markets where the funds rate 
operating procedure is explicitly integrated. It offers a more realistic view about how the interest 
rate policy is first put in place through the targeting of very short-run interest rate, contrary to the 
existing monetary policy literature which assumes that the central bank directly controls the 
interest rate affecting the aggregate demand. Thus, it allows understanding why these policies 
become suddenly necessary under extreme financial stress. It clarifies the links between the 
inflation-targeting regime and these policies when important financial and monetary shocks hit the 
economy. Our objective is to examine the dynamics of inflation and output gap when some or all 
of these policy options are adopted and how these variables will behave when a particular exit 
strategy is adopted. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the New 
Keynesian model extended to include credit, money and reserve markets. The third section 
presents the dynamics of inflation rate and output gap under the standard inflation-targeting 
regime. The fourth section examines the dynamic stability of the economy when it is hit by large 
persistent real, financial and monetary shocks such that the ZLB on the nominal discount rate is 
attained. In the fifth section, we examine the inflation and output-gap dynamics under quantitative 
and credit easing policies. The last section summarizes our findings.  
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2. The model 
The supply and demand sides of the economy are described by a stylized new-Keynesian model: 
ttttt x πελπβπ ++Ε= +1 , with 10 << β , 0>λ ,    (1) 
xtttctttt ixx επϕ +Ε−−Ε= ++ )( 11 , with 0>ϕ ,    (2) 
where tπ  ( 1−−≡ tt pp ) denotes the rate of inflation, tp  the (log) general price level, tx  the output 
gap (i.e., the log deviation of output from its flexible-price level), cti  the nominal credit market 
interest rate at which non-financial private sector can borrow from banks. 
Equation (1) represents the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, where the inflation rate is related 
to the expected future inflation rate ( 1+Ε ttπ ) and current marginal cost, which is affected by the 
output gap. The inflation shock, tπε , is due to productivity disturbances. 
Equation (2) is the expectational IS curve which relates the current output gap to the expected 
future output gap ( 1+Ε tt x ) and the real credit market interest rate. The latter is defined as the 
difference between the nominal credit-market interest rate cti  and the expected future rate of 
inflation, i.e. )( 1+Ε− ttcti π . 
We assume that the individual saver can save at cti  if she directly buys bonds emitted by 
firms, which offer a rate of return equal to cti . Furthermore, for simplicity, savers are assumed to 
save in a deposit account bearing no interests at banks and hence the intertemporal arbitrage 
between present consumption and saving depends only on cti . The aggregate demand shock, xtε , 
reflects either productivity disturbances which affect the flexible-price level of output or, 
equivalently, changes in the natural real interest rate. Without explicitly introducing asset prices, 
we admit that xtε  could also include wealth shocks affecting the aggregate demand.  
The money market equilibrium condition is given by 
ltmtttt ilxlpm ε+−=− 21 ,   with 0 , 21 >ll ,                   (3) 
where mti  is the nominal interest rate determined on the money market at which the banks can 
refinance, tm  represents the log nominal money supply, ltε  is a random money demand shock. 
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The money supply is endogenous but it is imperfectly elastic as the banking system will increase 
or decrease the internal money taking account of nominal interest rate and will not always satisfy 
the demand of this money (or credit) if it is expected to be unwarranted by collaterals. Similarly, 
the central bank provides a limited quantity of central-bank liquidity on the reserve market to a 
limited number of banks by accepting certain categories of assets as collaterals. Instead, if the 
central bank desires, control can be exercised over a narrow monetary aggregate such as base 
money (including reserves and currency), and its variations are then associated with these in 
broader measures of money supply.  
The link between the total money supply and the base money is modeled as follows:  
tmttt ihbm ω++= 1 ,   01 >h  .        (4) 
where tb  is the base money in log terms, and money multiplier ( tt bm −  in log terms) is assumed 
to be an increasing function of the nominal money-market interest rate, and tω  is a money-
multiplier disturbance. The money supply function is similar to that adopted by Modigliani et al. 
(1970), and McCallum and Hoehn (1983).  
We assume that the central bank indirectly targets money and credit market interest rates 
through the funds rate targeting procedure. Under this operating procedure, the central bank 
indirectly targets cti  or mti , longer term interest rates, by targeting in the first place the funds rate 
( fti ), a very short-run or overnight interest rate. More precisely, the central bank controls the 
discount rate, dti , and conducts open market operations in order to affect the supply of reserves in 
the banking system to target the funds rate. We assume that the access to the central-bank 
liquidity at the discount window is submitted to nonprice rationing, so that dtft ii ≠ .6 Similarly, we 
assume that the access to inside liquidity created within the banking and financial system here is 
subject to non-price rationing so that we generally have dtftmt iii ≠≠ .  
                                                 
6 In the absence of nonprice rationing at the discount window, the funds rate would never rise above the discount 
rate since a bank would never pay more for reserves than it would have to pay at the discount window 
(Goodfriend, 1983). 
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Adopting a simplified description of the reserve market to establish the link between the base 
money tb  and the discount rate dti , the money supply under the funds rate targeting procedure 
can be rewritten as (Appendix A) 
mtdtmttt ihihbm ε+−+= 21
~ ,   0, 21 >hh ,      (5) 
where tb
~  represents the currency in log terms but could also include the component of the 
reserves that the central bank can discretionarily control by adjusting the ratio of obligatory 
reserves, and mtε  represents shocks affecting the base money under the funds rate targeting 
procedure as well as these affecting the monetary multiplier. According to (5), the central bank, 
by controlling the discount rate, has not a strict control over the money supply since the latter is 
affected by the money-market interest rate and a random shock. However, in order to modify the 
behaviors of private agents and their inflation expectations, control can be exercised by the central 
bank over tb
~ , a component of base money which do not depend on the discount rate. The 
equilibrium condition on the money market (3) is rewritten as 
ltmtttmtdtmtt ilxlpihihb εε +−=−+−+ 2121
~ .  (6) 
In the following, we assume that 0221 >+− lhh . This is justified on the ground that the 
supply of liquidity by the banking sector is most likely determined by the difference ( dtmt ii − ), i.e. 
the net gain obtained from providing more liquidity while refinancing it at the discount rate. Thus, 
an increase of equal amount in dti  and mti  will not (or modestly) affect the money supply but will 
significantly reduce the money demand, ceteris paribus.  
The model is completed by a credit market equilibrium condition in the spirit of Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988): 
ctcttctmt ijxjifif ε+−=+− 2121 ,          with 0,,, 2121 >jjff ,        (7) 
where ctε  denotes a random shock that includes both credit supply and credit demand shocks. 
Equation (7) gives the credit-market clearing condition and it allows determining cti  for given 
mti . The supply of loans decreases with mti  and increases with cti . The demand of loans decreases 
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with cti  and it is an increasing function of output gap tx  due to transactions demand for credit, 
which might arise, for example, from working capital or liquidity considerations. We admit that 
0221 <−− jff , i.e. an increase of identical amount in mti  and cti  will leave the credit supply 
stable or decreasing less (because the lending margin in absolute terms is unchanged and only the 
margin in relative terms is reduced) than the credit demand.  
Some modifications relative to the model of Bernanke and Blinder have been introduced. 
Public bonds are not included in the present model since its rate of return could stay relatively 
stable in the event of important negative financial shocks affecting private sectors. The private 
bonds are assumed to be a perfect substitute to bank lending. Another modification consists to 
assume that the longer term money-market interest rate mti , instead of long term public bonds, 
affects both the demand and supply of liquidity on the money market. For simplicity, we have 
assumed that mti  does not affect consumption and investment decisions. Despite these 
simplifications, by giving a special attention to reserve, money and credit markets, we can quite 
realistically expose how the central bank’s interest rate policy makes its way into the economy. 
Such a framework is more adapted for examining how the inflation expectations behave when the 
ZLB on the nominal interest rate is encountered.  
When the central bank sets dti , it must recursively determine the target of dti  using equations 
(6)-(7) once the target of credit market interest rate is known. Thus, given that the money-market 
equilibrium condition (6) determines the value for dti  in order to attain the target of other interest 
rates, it follows that the money supply cannot be endogenously determined using (6) as it is 
usually assumed in the inflation targeting literature (Woodford, 1998; King, 2000).  
In the inflation-targeting literature, it is assumed that the money supply automatically adjusts 
to the money demand so that the money market can be ignored without serious consequences. In 
this model, by assuming that market interest rates and discount rate are distinct, the central bank 
will not always be able to control the market interest rates without manipulating the money 
supply. In other words, the money supply is partially endogenous and does not automatically 
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adjust to satisfy the money demand except when the central bank maintains the risk premium on 
the money-market interest rate over the discount rate, dtmtmt ii −=ρ , at a fixed level. This opens 
the door to quantitative or/and credit easing policies, considered as useful tools to target market 
interest rates in critical situations, i.e. when the discount rate cannot be decreased anymore due to 
the ZLB on the nominal interest rate.  
The model is closed with the specification of central bank’s objective function, which 
translates the behavior of the target variables into a welfare measure to guide the policy choice. 
We assume that this objective function is over the target variables tx  and tπ , and takes the form: 
∑
∞
=
++ −+Ε=
0
22 ])([
2
1
i
T
itit
i
t
CB xL ππαβ ,        (10) 
where the parameter α  is the relative weight on output deviations. The central bank’s loss 
depends on output gap variability around of zero and inflation variability around of its constant 
target Tπ  which can be zero or positive. Since tx  is the output gap, the loss function takes 
potential output as the target. The strategy of flexible inflation targeting is implemented through 
an optimal nominal interest rate rule, which is deduced from the optimal inflation-targeting rule of 
the central bank which acts to minimize fluctuations of output gap and inflation rate around their 
respective target under discretion.  
The time sequence of events is as follows: 1) Workers form inflation expectations and 
negotiate wages taking account of all available information about the economy. 2) Shocks realize. 
3) The central bank sets the discount rate following an optimal interest rate rule. 4) Firms decide 
their production and prices.  
The minimization of loss function (10) subject to the Phillips curve (1) leads to the following 
targeting rules in the sense of Svensson (2002):  
)( Tttx ππα
λ
−−= ,         (11) 
)( 11
T
tttt x ππα
λ
−Ε−=Ε ++ .             (12) 
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Equations (1)-(2) and targeting rules (11)-(12) allow defining the following instrument rule in 
the sense of Svensson (2002):  
xtt
T
tt
T
cti εϕ
ε
λαϕ
λπ
λααϕ
λπ
λααϕ
λααβλ
π
1
)()()(
)(1 22
3
12
2
+
+
+
+
+Ε





+
−−
+= + ,    (13) 
The optimal target of credit-market interest rate, Tcti , implied by the minimization of central 
bank’s loss function, must react positively to the expected future rate of inflation if 
0)()( 22 >−−++ λααβλλααϕ . It reacts positively to a variation in Tπ , and shocks xtε  and 
πε t . 
The credit-market interest rate is indirectly controlled by the central bank through the funds rate 
targeting procedure. The latter affects then the longer term money-market interest rate before 
affecting the credit-market interest rate.  
Using (7) and (13), we deduce that the optimal target of money-market interest rate Tmti : 
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which shows that Tmti  is positively related to 
T
cti  and it depends on the structural parameters of the 
credit market and shocks affecting the latter.   
Using (6) and (14), we obtain the optimal target of discount rate  
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Equation (15) allows then determining the target for average funds rate (see Appendix A).  
In normal situation, when the financial markets function smoothly, the ZLB on the nominal 
discount rate will not be hit. Assume that the central bank sets the discount rate to attain the other 
interest rate targets under the funds rate operating procedure. Using (13)-(15), the equilibrium risk 
premiums are defined as:  
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The equilibrium risk premiums depend on the parameters characterizing the structure of goods, 
credit, money and reserve markets, inflation expectations, inflation target, output gap, as well as 
shocks affecting these markets. They could be kept at relatively low level when the economy is in 
expansion but could be enlarged to a high level, incompatible with the optimal interest rate policy 
defined under the inflation-targeting regime. 
Equations (13)-(15) capture well the complexity of indirect market interest rate targeting 
through the funds rate operating procedure. The transmission mechanism is imperfectly 
observable by the central bank since it could be hit by numerous unanticipated shocks affecting 
the goods, credit, money and reserve markets. Furthermore, shocks affecting the interest rate 
policy could also interfere with the transmission mechanism. In some circumstances, negative 
disturbances in financial and corporate sectors can create dislocation on financial markets and 
enlarge the difference between the discount rate, and the money- and credit-market interest rates 
such that the discount and funds rates hit the ZLB while the market interest rates are still too high 
for the economy to recover from a severe depression.  
 
3. Inflation and output dynamics in the benchmark model  
In the inflation-targeting literature, it is a usual practice to assume that all interest rates are equal. 
Therefore, a funds rate targeting procedure is equivalent to the one directly targeting the interest 
rate which directly affects the aggregate demand. This assumption could be justified if all 
financial assets are perfect substitutes, all financial and monetary markets function perfectly and 
there are no frictions or major disturbances which are out of the control of the central bank.  
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Under this kind of assumptions, the model is reduced to (1)-(2). Subject to these two 
equations, the central bank minimizes the loss function (10). This leads to the targeting rules (11)-
(12) and the optimal credit-market interest rate rule (13). If the central bank sets the credit market 
interest rate following (13), the targeting rules (11)-(12) will be verified. Thus, the difference 
equation for the inflation rate is deduced using (1) and (11): 
t
T
ttt πεβ
π
αβ
λπ
α
λ
β
π 1)1(1
22
1 −−+=Ε + .      (16) 
The eigenvalue of the difference equation (16) is greater than unity. Consequently, as there is one 
forward-looking variable, i.e. 1+Ε ttπ , the equilibrium is stable. The dynamics of output gap is 
determined by that of inflation rate according to the targeting rule (12). We remark that the 
inflation dynamics is governed by a very simple mechanism and depends uniquely on parameters 
characterizing the Phillips curve and central bank preferences.  
 
4. Inflation dynamics when the ZLB on the discount rate is hit 
We observe that the ZLB on the nominal discount and funds interest rates are hit in Japan during 
the 2000 and now in USA during the current financial crisis. One common point between these 
two circumstances is that both countries are exposed to colossal speculative bubbles on several 
asset markets. Therefore, the ZLB on the nominal interest rate cannot be appropriately examined 
if such shocks can not be taken into account in the model. This is the case in the standard New-
Keynesian model where the ZLB on the nominal discount and funds interest rates is often 
confused with the ZLB on the credit-market interest rate. The later has neither been effectively 
observed in Japan nor in the USA or any other country. The present model introduces the money, 
credit and reserve markets and hence allows to consider the effects due to the burst of the bubbles 
in the prices of real and financial assets through the shocks affecting different markets. It is to 
notice that real, financial and monetary shocks that lead the economy into a liquidity trap and the 
central bank to practice unconventional monetary policies appear generally after an extended 
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period of sustained rapid economic expansion and the burst of great speculative asset price 
bubbles formed during the period. 
During the last two decades, using an interest rate policy, central banks in many countries 
have achieved the “great moderation” characterized by moderate and stable inflation rate and less 
fluctuation of output growth around its potential. A benign macroeconomic environment of great 
moderation could encourage financial agents to abandon their prudent approach of investing, 
lending and other financing decisions which balance macroeconomic and idiosyncratic risks, and 
to progressively espouse exuberant approaches (Carney, 2009). Thus, they take the maximum risk 
exposure compatible with the existing regulations, thinking that they all have the chance of 
quitting the sinking Titanic ship before the others or that the monetary and fiscal authorities will 
save them.  
The asset bubbles created under this state of spirit could favour the success of monetary and 
fiscal policies. Therefore, policymakers might seek to create bubbles and might not want to take 
account of the potential damages induced by their burst because such damages will only 
materialize in the future and create difficulties for future policymakers. When the bubbles attain 
the extreme limit, menacing hence the central bank’s principal objectives of price stability and 
output stabilization, they will be indirectly pricked by policymakers through creating monetary or 
fiscal conditions unfavourable for them to continue to grow rapidly. Their burst generates great 
financial and monetary as well as real shocks because a large number of agents have been 
excessively involved, often with large leverage based on overpriced collateral. The failure of 
some great financial institutions becomes a dilemma for the monetary and fiscal authorities. 
Avoiding any potential bankruptcy among these institutions envoys a bad message according to 
which the speculative feast could continue. On the opposite, not bailing out them could induce 
financial panics, amplifying hence the shocks generated by the burst of large asset bubbles. 
When such bubbles are pricked, to avoid dramatic consequences on the real economy (i.e. 
deep economic recession and deflation), setting the nominal discount rate at zero is inevitable. In 
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the case of Japan, the zero nominal discount rate is not sufficient to avoid the deflation and it does 
not provide a sufficient stimulus for the economy. Therefore, the question is under what 
conditions the deflation (or, on the contrary, the hyperinflation) can be avoided and how will 
behave the expected inflation rate and output gap once such a policy is implemented. 
The ZLB on the nominal interest rate is hit when the target of discount rate determined by 
(15) is less than or equal to zero, i.e. 0≤Tdti . The zero interest rate policy corresponds to a 
suboptimal equilibrium if setting the discount rate at zero cannot bring the credit-market interest 
rate to a level which is optimal for the central bank because the optimal target of discount rate is 
smaller than zero. To make the monetary policy effective, large negative shocks on goods, credit, 
money and reserve markets imply a need for simultaneously implementing zero discount rate, and 
quantitative and credit easing policies. 
When shocks affecting money and credit markets generate major dislocations on goods and 
labor markets, the dynamics of inflation expectations will be greatly modified. The expectations 
of future inflation and output gap will be determined quite differently compared to these under a 
normally functioning inflation-targeting regime where they, always independent of financial and 
monetary shocks, will be determined by the central bank’s targets except when inflation shocks 
are persistent. When the ZLB on the nominal discount rate is hit, the optimal targeting rules in the 
sense of Svensson (2002) will not be verified. The current and expected inflation rates and output 
gaps will depend on the functioning of credit and money markets because the latter determine the 
credit-market interest rate which directly affects the aggregate demand. Therefore, shocks 
affecting credit, money and reserve markets will be transmitted through this channel to the 
inflation rate and output gap. This mechanism is unconceivable in standard New-Keynesian 
models where credit, money and reserve markets are absent and where the ZLB on the nominal 
discount rate is confounded with that on the credit-market interest rate.  
 Knowing that, when the ZLB on the nominal discount rate is hit, the equilibrium conditions 
on the credit and money markets have important role to play in determining the equilibrium level 
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of current and future inflation rates and output gaps, the central bank and private agents who want 
to form good inflation expectations cannot neglect the developments on these markets, 
particularly, when the functioning of credit and money markets is such that any inadequate 
monetary policy response to these shocks can put the economy either on diverging inflationary or 
deflationary paths for a long time. 
The model is solved by determining recursively the money-market interest rate mti  using (6) 
for 0=dti  and then the nominal credit-market interest rate cti  using (7) and finally substituting 
the solution of cti  into the IS equation (2). The resulting equation and the Phillips curve (1) allow 
solving for equilibrium values of expected and current inflation rates and output gaps and 
determining if a crisis equilibrium is stable or not.  
Using (6), the money-market interest rate is expressed by: 
 )~(1 1
21
mtlttttmt xlbplh
i εε −++−
+
= .        (17) 
In a liquidity trap, ltε  is likely to be important and mtε  likely to be small. Even though the output 
gap could be negative, its impact could be insignificant for bringing down the nominal money-
market interest rate, a median term rate, to zero.  
Using (7) and (17), the credit-market interest rate is given as 

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21
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)~(1 .           (18) 
During a period where the economy is affected by large negative financial shocks, the credit 
demand is likely to decrease but the credit supply could decrease further as banks become more 
prudent or impose more restrictive conditions on credit distribution, so that ctε  is likely to be 
positive and could be more than compensating the effects of negative output gap on the 
equilibrium credit-market interest rate.  
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Substituting cti  determined by (18) into (2), and taking account of (1), we obtain the inflation 
rate and output gap as function of expected inflation rate, output gap, current price level, current 
stock of currency and different shocks:  
)(11 ttttt x πελπβ
π −−=Ε + ,        (19) 
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where xtctjftmtltlhjf
f
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1 )())(( . Since )1(1 ttt pp π+= − , the system 
constituted of (19)-(20) has two forward-looking variables, 1+tt xE  and 1+ttE π , and one 
predetermined variable, 1−tp . Equation (20) could be rewritten as: 
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The private sector is assumed to form rational inflation expectations conditional on 
information available at t . The equilibrium value of 1−tπ , 1−tx , tπ , tx , 1+ttE π , and 1+tt xE  can be 
solved in accordance with the method of undetermined coefficients (McCallum, 1983). Since 
these solutions are quite cumbersome and they are not central to the dynamic analysis of inflation 
and output gap, they are not given in this paper. We pay instead our attention to the 
complementary solutions.  
Denote the eigenvalues of the difference equations (19) and (21) by e . We can show that they 
must satisfy the following relation (Appendix B): 
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The nature of the dynamic system will depend on the roots of the polynomial 
)()()( eeeF Φ−Θ= . Since the exact solutions of these roots will not be interpretable due to their 
complexity, to study the magnitude of these roots, it turns out convenient to use a mixture of 
graphical and analytical techniques. Therefore, to find e  solving 0)( =eF  is equivalent to find e  
solving the equation )()( ee Φ=Θ . The left hand of this equation, )(eΘ , is a cubic function and 
the right hand of this equation )(eΦ  linear function. Assume that the financial system is 
sufficiently developed, algebraic analysis combined with graphical method shows that two kinds 
of dynamics can be distinguished (Appendix C). 7    
In the event where β
))((
1
2122 lhjff ++< , the credit supply is insufficiently elastic with regard to 
money-market interest rate. In this case, there is one positive eigenvalue which is smaller than 
unity but two eigenvalues greater than unity. Given that the dynamic system has two forward-
looking variables and one predetermined variable, the crisis equilibrium is stable.  
If β
))((
1
2122 lhjff ++> , i.e. the credit supply is sufficiently elastic with regard to the money-
market interest rate, there is one positive eigenvalue which is smaller than unity. There are two 
complex eigenvalues with a positive real part greater than unity. Hence, the crisis equilibrium is 
cyclically stable.  
In both cases considered above, the crisis equilibrium is stable. Consequently, it could form a 
liquidity trap so that a temporary injection of liquidity will not be able to modify the expectations 
about future inflation and output gap and hence the crisis equilibrium. As the crisis equilibrium is 
stable, it is impossible to pull the economy out of financial and economic crisis by talking 
optimistically to financial market operators and the general public because there does not exist a 
diverging trajectory leading the economy out of the crisis equilibrium. 
Since the crisis equilibrium is a liquidity trap, the central bank must react quickly and 
vigorously to avoid this equilibrium to be anchored in private expectations by using policy 
                                                 
7 A well-developed financial system is considered as a condition necessary for the adoption of inflation 
targeting. The conditions corresponding to this assumption are given in Appendix C. 
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measures which could counterbalance the effects of violent financial and monetary shocks. 
Several possibilities offered to the central bank. One is to act on the monetary market through 
massively increasing the reserves or/and currency. Another is to increase the credit supply by 
buying private bonds to fully compensate the effects of real, financial and monetary shocks on the 
credit-market interest rate.  
The actions on the money market may not be enough if the decrease in money-market interest 
rate is not (or only very partially) transmitted to the credit market, i.e. if 1f  tends to be very small. 
In this case, there might need a very great increase in the reserves and/or currency, which could be 
incompatible with the mandate of the central bank and could disturb the market expectations, 
leading hence to criticism of the central banker.  
 
5. Quantitative and credit easing policies and dynamic stability  
In many industrial countries, the burst of large bubbles in real and financial asset prices formed 
during the decade of “great moderation” could be a long process and could affect the economic 
equilibrium during a long period. To avoid that their burst leads to developments similar to these 
observed in Japan during the decades 1990 and 2000, where the prices of real state and stocks are 
still largely lower than the highest levels attained at the end of 1989, appropriate policy responses 
are necessary to answer to the waves of real, financial and monetary shocks linked to such a burst.  
Absorbing large negative disturbances on the goods market may require a low credit-market 
interest rate which may not be within the reach of the central bank when the financial and 
monetary markets are also affected by large negative disturbances and the ZLB on the nominal 
discount and funds interest rates is encountered. By manipulating only the discount rate and 
targeting funds rate through open market operations to indirectly affect the lending interest rates, 
the central bank has no credible instrument of anchoring the inflation expectations besides the 
cheap talk about its firm intention to attain its inflation target and to stabilize the economy. The 
real challenge appears whenever the economy is deviating from the normal equilibrium, where the 
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inflation rate and output gap are stabilized, and is converging to the crisis equilibrium. If this is 
the case, non-orthodox monetary policy, such as quantitative easing policy, must be used to ease 
the tension on the money market. Furthermore, the credit easing policy could be needed in order 
to ease the conditions on the credit market, through for example strengthening banks’ balance 
sheet and/or buying private debts on the credit market by the central bank or Treasury. 
These two monetary policies could be clearly distinguished in our framework. Due to the ZLB 
on the nominal discount rate as well as the malfunctioning of money and credit markets, the zero 
interest rate policy does not allow the realization of optimal money- and credit-market interest 
rates. In this case, the effective money- and credit-market interest rates determined by the 
equilibrium conditions on money and credit markets will be higher than their respective optimal 
target given by (14) and (13). If no measure is taken to directly affect the equilibrium conditions 
on the money and credit markets, the targeting rules (11)-(12) will not be effective. 
In the following, we first analyze the inflation and output gap dynamics under the quantitative 
easing policy as practiced by the Bank of Japan. Then, we turn to analyze the dynamics of these 
variables under a combination of quantitative and credit easing policies as in the case of the Fed, 
the Bank of England or the ECB.  
 
5.1. Quantitative easing policy 
The quantitative easing policy defined in the sense of Ben Bernanke is only directed to the money 
market. It consists to inject an important quantity of reserve which is greater than what is 
necessary to keep the funds interest rate at zero. By targeting the liquidity in the banking and 
financial system, the quantitative easing policy is used to induce an increase in the supply on the 
credit markets through the reduction of the money-market interest rate. The abundance of liquidity 
in the banking system is such that banks will not try to retain it by fear of its penury. This allows 
stimulating interbank lending and could bring down the money- and credit- market interest rates. 
The objective of the quantitative easing policy is to bring down the credit interest rate to a target 
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level which is compatible with the normal equilibrium in the absence of financial and monetary 
shocks. Denote by eq  the quantity of base monetary in the form of reserves injected by the central 
bank into the banking system, the equilibrium condition on the money market (6) is rewritten as:  
ltmtttmtdtmtt
e ilxlpihihbq εε +−=−+−++ 2121
~ .  (23) 
By targeting the liquidity on the money market, the central banks can reduce the effects of 
excessively adverse money supply and demand shocks which drive the money-market interest rate 
to a too high level incompatible with the realization of inflation and output-gap targets. For 
0=dti  and 0>
eq , (23) gives the money-market interest rate as: 
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Consider in the following three scenarios.  
 
Positive optimal target of money-market interest rate 
If the target of money-market interest rate given by (14) is positive, i.e. 0≥Tmti , the central bank 
can use the quantitative easing policy to achieve the objectives of macroeconomic stabilization 
and to ensure the dynamic stability of inflation expectations as under the standard inflation-
targeting regime by setting eq  to ensure that Tmtmt ii = . If this is the case, the quantitative easing 
policy is fully efficient in the sense that the targeting rules (11)-(12) are verified and the effects of 
shocks affecting aggregate demand, and credit, money and reserve markets are fully 
counterbalanced. The inflation and output dynamics is similar to that in the benchmark case 
corresponding to the standard inflation-targeting regime described in section 3. In this scenario, 
the economy is confronted a financial and economic crisis which does not constitute a liquidity 
trap. 
 
Insufficient responses of the central bank to large adverse shocks 
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If shocks affecting negatively the aggregate demand, and money and credit supplies, and 
positively the demand for liquidity are extremely large and persistent, the central bank may not be 
able to counterbalance them. In effect, responding to such large shocks by injecting very large 
quantity of central-bank liquidity into the banking and financial sectors could lead to the criticism 
of the central bank for sowing seeds for future asset price bubbles and moral hazards in these 
sectors. This could induce the central bank, instead of restoring the optimal equilibrium, to 
conduct an incomplete quantitative easing policy in the sense that the realized money market 
interest rate given by (24) is higher than its target level, i.e. Tmtmt ii > . Given mti  determined by 
(24), the nominal credit-market interest rate is 
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which is higher than the optimal target of credit-market interest rate determined by (13) but lower 
than that determined by (18).  
The difference equation for inflation rate is always given by (19). Substituting cti  given by 
(25) into (2), and taking account of (1), we obtain the difference equation for output gap:  
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The only difference between (20) and (26) is found in the constant terms, with the presence in 
(26) of the supplementary terms including eq  representing the quantitative easing policy. If eq  is 
not specified as function of endogenous variables, the property of the dynamic adjustment of 
inflation rate and output gap described by (19) and (26) is identical to that described by the system 
of difference equations (19) and (20) examined in the case where the central bank practices only 
the zero discount rate policy. Using the previous results concerning the stability of the crisis 
equilibrium, we conclude that a partial quantitative easing policy cannot draw the economy out of 
the liquidity trap even it is accompanied by an excellent central bank communication. 
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The existence of a ZLB for nominal money-market interest rate  
The nominal money-market interest rate hits itself the ZLB when the optimal target of money-
market interest rate is negative under the effects of shocks, i.e. 0<Tmti . The central bank sets it 
at zero since mti  cannot fall below zero. It follows from (7) that the nominal credit-market interest 
rate is given by  
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= ,        (27) 
which is also higher than Tcti  given by (13) but below that given by (18). Under these conditions, 
the money market becomes a liquidity trap in the sense of Keynes. 
Rearranging the terms in (1) leads to  
)(11 ttttt x πελπβ
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Substituting cti  given by (27) into the IS equation (2) and using (28) to eliminate 1+Ε ttπ  in the 
resulting equation yield:  
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We remark that, in the present case, the dynamic system (28)-(29) and hence the equilibrium 
depends on shocks affecting the credit market through the presence of the term ctjf ε
ϕ
22 +
 in (29), 
contrary to what happens under the standard inflation-targeting regime where the central bank is 
able to directly target the interest rate affecting the aggregate demand (see (16)). Furthermore, the 
dynamic adjustment depends on parameters characterizing financial conditions, i.e. ϕ  , 2f  and 
2j . The eigenvalues of the system of difference equations (28)-(29) must satisfy 
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which leads to the polynomial  
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





∆+
+
+++=
22
1
1
11
2
1
jf
je ϕ
β
λϕ
β
 and 





∆−
+
+++=
22
1
2
11
2
1
jf
je ϕ
β
λϕ
β
 ; 
where 0)1()1)((2)()1(4)1( 2112121
22
1
22
1
22
1
22
1 >−+++++=+−+++=∆ ++++ β
ϕϕ
ββ
λϕ
β
λϕϕ
β
ϕ
β
λϕ
β jf
j
jf
j
jf
j
jf
j . It is 
easy to show that 11 >e , and  12 <e  if )()1( 221 jfj +<− λβ  and 12 >e  if )()1( 221 jfj +>− λβ . 
In practice, we can have either 12 >e  or 12 <e . However, prominent studies of monetary 
policy implications of New Keynesian model, including that of Clarida et al. (1999), impose that 
1=β  or arbitrarily near to unity. Admitting that β  is arbitrarily near to unity as King (2000), we 
have therefore one stable eigenvalue ( 11 >e ) and one unstable ( 12 <e ). Given that there are two 
forward-looking variables, the equilibrium under the quantitative easing policy with the money-
market interest rate hitting the ZLB is saddle-point stable. Therefore, when the nominal money-
market interest rate hits itself the ZLB, the central bank needs very good communication skills to 
convince that its quantitative easing policy is effective and can pull the economy out of the crisis 
equilibrium. Otherwise, the private expectations could take a bad trajectory and drag the economy 
back into the liquidity trap.  
The quantitative easing policy, accompanied by a good communication, could be effective for 
avoiding the liquidity trap except when it is only too timidly applied. The communication is 
crucial since the economy could borrow a diverging adjustment leading to the crisis equilibrium 
as well as a trajectory leading to an equilibrium where the effects of adverse shocks are 
moderated. However, if these shocks have large negative effects on the aggregate demand and are 
persistent, the quantitative easing policy must be maintained as long as the effects of these shocks 
continue to affect the economy. An exit strategy from this policy too prematurely applied could 
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make unsuccessful the anchoring of private expectations at the good equilibrium and hence induce 
the economy to return to the crisis equilibrium. 
 
5.2. Simultaneous use of quantitative and credit easing policies 
As we have discussed above, it may not be sufficient for the central bank to uniquely applying the 
quantitative easing policy to the banking system by inundating the latter with excessive central-
bank liquidity when the ZLB on the nominal discount rate is hit. The gravity of the economic and 
financial situation could incite the politicians to ask the central bank to apply the credit easing 
policy in order to avoid the systemic risk induced by important bankruptcies due to severe credit 
crunch. Furthermore, the money-market interest rate could hit itself the ZLB while the credit-
market interest rate still stay at a high level implying a dangerously low inflation rate (or even 
deflation) and a collapse in output. Hence, it is necessary to extend the quantitative easing policy 
to principal operators on the supply side of the credit market. 
Applying the credit easing policy has some different implications in terms of interest rate 
policy. Notably, this means that the central bank is using temporarily a credit-market interest rate 
procedure which is implicitly assumed in the inflation-targeting literature. We consider two 
scenarios in the following. 
 
Credit-market interest rate equal to its optimal target  
Assume that the central bank practices simultaneously the quantitative and credit easing policies. 
The equilibrium condition on the money market is given by (23). Denote by cq  the quantity of 
credit assets bought by the central bank under the credit easing policy. The equilibrium condition 
on the credit market (7) is rewritten as  
ctcttctmt
c ijxjififq ε+−=+− 2121 ,        (31) 
By coupling these two policy measures with the zero discount rate policy, the central bank is 
always able to bring down the credit-market interest rate to its optimal target level determined by 
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(13), i.e. Tctct ii = . In this case, the inflation and output dynamics will be identical to that under the 
benchmark inflation-targeting regime. 
 
Credit-market interest rate different from its optimal target  
If the quantitative easing and credit easing policies coupled with the zero discount rate policy are 
not designed to ensure that Tctct ii =  or to make the values of 
cq  and eq  dependent on endogenous 
variables, the dynamics of inflation and output gap could be similar to that described by equations 
(19) and (20) (or (21)) with an important difference, i.e. the new dynamic system has a quasi-
normal equilibrium that the central bank desires to attain while the system (19)-(20) corresponds 
to a bad equilibrium of liquidity trap. 
Assume that it is not necessary for the quantitative easing policy to bring the money-market 
interest rate down to zero. The money-market interest rate is determined using (23). Substituting 
mti  given by (24) into (31) and rearranging the terms yield 
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The difference equation for inflation rate is given by (19). Substituting cti  given by (32) into 
(2), and taking account of (1), we obtain the difference equation for output gap as:  
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Since the only difference between (20) and (33) is found in the constant terms, with the 
presence in (33) of the supplementary terms including eq  and cq  representing respectively 
quantitative and credit easing policies, the property of the dynamic adjustment of inflation rate 
and output gap described by (19) and (33) is identical to that described by (19) and (20). It means 
that as long as the central bank keeps using simultaneously the quantitative and credit easing 
policies, the equilibrium that the central bank battles for is stable and credible. It is not difficult in 
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this case to anchor private expectations by making public announce of a prolonged period of zero 
discount rate policy coupled with quantitative and credit easing policies. However, as we have 
emphasized before, if the public believes that the shocks are more or less permanent and these 
policies are only temporary even though they will be maintained for an extended period, private 
expectations will not be well anchored by the announces about these policies and/or by any 
reaffirmation of the central bank’s inflation and output gap targets.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines inflation and output gap dynamics when unconventional monetary policies, 
such as zero discount rate policy and quantitative and credit easing policies, are adopted by a 
central bank to avoid the collapse of financial and economic system after having observed that 
manipulating the discount rate to target the funds rate is not anymore sufficient to stabilize the 
economy due to the ZLB on the nominal discount rate.  
By extending the standard New-Keynesian model to include credit, money and reserve 
markets, we have enriched the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the way that the 
central bank using the funds rate operating procedure, i.e. targeting the very short-run interbank 
interest rate, controls only indirectly the market interest rates which effectively affects the 
investment and consumption. This new framework has the advantage of allowing the reintegration 
of shocks affecting money, credit and reserve markets into the monetary policy analysis. It can be 
easily used to analyze the dynamic behavior of inflation and output-gap when a combination of 
unconventional policies is implemented. 
We have shown that, when large adverse real, financial and monetary shocks lead the central 
bank to set the nominal discount rate at zero, the crisis equilibrium which could be a liquidity trap 
is stable. This implies that the communication by the central bank cannot bring back the economy 
on a trajectory leading to the optimal equilibrium where the inflation and output gap are 
stabilized, and the effects of financial and monetary shocks are fully neutralized.  
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 To avoid the liquidity trap, the quantitative easing policy defined as the injection of liquidity 
in the banking sector could be an effective measure as long as the central bank can inject all the 
amount of liquidity to drive to a sufficiently low level the money-market interest rate in order to 
reduce the credit-market interest rate, and the money-market interest rate is not hitting itself the 
ZLB. In the opposite case, the quantitative easing policy does not allow the economy to come 
back to the optimal equilibrium. Furthermore, the temporary equilibrium at the ZLB on the 
money-market interest rate is saddle-point stable. This implies a good communication of the 
central bank is extremely important for keeping the economy at the temporary equilibrium or 
bringing it on a trajectory leading to higher inflation rate and output gap. Otherwise, the economy 
can return to the crisis equilibrium. 
By combining the zero discount rate and quantitative easing policies with the credit easing 
policy, which is destined to bring down the credit-market interest rate to a sufficiently low level to 
neutralize the effects of financial and monetary shocks as well as demand shocks on the economy, 
the central bank can stabilize the inflation expectations and hence the economy. However, the 
success of the central bank will depend on the degree of persistence of these shocks, how long the 
central bank is able to keep the discount rate at zero and how long the quantitative and credit 
easing policies will be maintained in place. If the quantitative easing and credit easing policies are 
only temporary measures, which are removed before the effects of initial adverse shocks are 
counterbalanced by the effects of other favorable shocks, the economy can return to the crisis 
equilibrium. 
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Appendix A: The money supply under the funds rate targeting procedure 
The monetary base tMB is constituted of the total reserve tTR  and currency tC , the latter is 
exogenously fixed by the central bank. The relationship is expressed in log terms as: 
tttttt cCMB
CTR
MB
TRMBb )1(logloglog *
*
*
*
ψψχ −+≡+=≡ ,     (A.1) 
where tt TRlog≡χ , tt Cc log≡ , *
*
MB
TR≡ψ , and the superscript asterisk designs the steady state.  
In order to clarify the link between the tb  and the discount rate, a simplified description of the 
reserve market is adopted. We assume that the central bank uses a funds rate targeting procedure. 
Under this procedure, it controls the discount rate dti  and conducts open market operations to affect 
the supply of reserves in the banking system to target the funds rate, fti . The latter is the interest rate 
banks in need of reserves pay to borrow from banks with surplus reserves. Thus, total reserves and 
hence the base money tb  will depend on dti .  
Reserve demand is assumed to be a negative function of fti  and it arises mainly from the 
requirement that banks hold reserves equal to a specified fraction of their deposit liability. For 
simplicity, other factors such as aggregate income and prices are treated as part of the error term, dtν , 
i.e. a disturbance of reserve demand. The function of total reserve demand is:  
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t iTR νφχ +−=≡ log .              (A.2) 
The total supply of reserves in the banking system can be expressed as the sum of the reserves that 
banks have borrowed from the central bank ( tBR ) and nonborrowed reserves ( tNBR ), i.e. 
tt
s
t NBRBRTR += . Rewriting this relation in log terms gives 
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where *
*
TR
BR≡γ , t
b
t BRlog≡χ  and t
nb
t NBRlog≡χ . 
The reserve market is in equilibrium whenever we have 
s
t
d
t χχ = .          (A.4) 
Similarly to Walsh (2003), we postulate a simple reserve borrowing function:8 
b
tdtft
b
t ii νζχ +−= )( ,   0>ζ ,             (A.5) 
The parameter ζ  specifies how a variation in fti  affects reserve borrowings and it depends on how 
such a variation affects expectations of future funds rate levels not modelled here. Due to non-price 
rationing of access to the central-bank liquidity, we have dtft ii ≠ . The shock 
b
tν  represents other 
factors affecting reserve borrowings. 
Under the funds rate targeting procedure, the central bank entirely compensates the effects on fti  
of shocks affecting the reserve demand and the borrowed reserves by varying the non-borrowed 
reserves. Hence, the funds rate is determined by the discount rate. Nonetheless, the funds rate targeting 
is imperfect since it is subject to a monetary policy shock stν . The nonborrowed reserves are given 
by:9 
s
t
b
t
d
t
nb
t ννγ
γν
γ
χ +
−
−
−
=
11
1 .               (A.6) 
                                                 
8 The specification of functions tBR  and tNBR  follows Walsh (2003). They are rewritten in logs terms here. In 
more elaborated reserve market model, the total supply of reserves could also depend on future interest rates 
(Walsh, 1982; Goodfriends, 1983).  
9 For the implications of other operating procedures and a brief history of operating procedures used by the Fed 
and some other central banks, see Walsh (2003, pages 451-71).  
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Using (A.2)-(A.3) and (A.5)-(A.6), we rewrite the equilibrium condition on the reserve market 
(A.4) as: 
s
tdtftft iii νγγζφ )1()( −+−=− .        (A.7) 
Solving (A.2) and (A.7) for fti  and tχ in terms of 
d
ti  and shocks results to: 
s
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Substituting tχ  given by (A.9) into (A.1) and assuming that cct =  (i.e. the amount of currency 
is given at period t), the monetary base is expressed therefore as:  
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Using (A.10) and (4), the money supply is written as:  
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Appendix B. The derivation of equation (22) 
Assume that the solutions of inflation and output gap are of the following form: 
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where m and n are coefficients to be determined. Since 1
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tt e ππ , forward-looking expectations imply that the equilibrium 
is stable if 1>e . Upon substituting the trial solutions into the reduced (homogenous) version of (19) 
and (21), we obtain: 
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Cancelling the common factors, 01 ≠−te  or 0≠te , in (B.1)-(B.2) and arranging the terms yield: 
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To avoid the trivial solutions 0== nm , which would result in trivial complementary solutions 
01111 ====== −++− tttttt xxxπππ  as well, the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (B.3)-(B.4) 
is required to vanish. It follows that we must have: 
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Developing (B.5) leads to 
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Rearranging the terms, the function )(eF  can be decomposed as in (22). ■ 
 
Appendix C. Determination of the eigenvalues of the dynamic system ((19) and (21)) through 
graphical resolution of (22) 
Determining the roots of 0)( =Θ e  and 0)( =Φ e : It is a simple matter to determine the roots of 
these equations since )(eΦ  is linear and the cubic function )(eΘ  is built in the way that  
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The cubic equation 0)( =Θ e  has three solutions which are respectively 
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The parameter ϕ  is a measure of the development of financial intermediation. It shows how the 
aggregate demand is affected by a change in the real interest rate. 
The linear equation 0)( =Φ e  has one solution:  
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Graphing the functions )(eΘ  and )(eΦ  to determine the stability condition: A graph of these 
functions provides the easiest way of determining the nature of the roots of the cubic polynomial 
0)()()( =Φ−Θ= eeeF . To limit the cases, we assume that the financial system is sufficiently 
developed such that:  
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that we have 32 ee <  and 34 ee < . The latter is evidently true if 04 <e  and it is also true if 04 >e  
since under the above condition, we have 
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Figure 1 represents the case where 04 >e , β
))((
1
2122 lhjff ++<∀ . It contains three functions. One of 
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the solid lines is the cubic function )(eΘ , which highlights the fact that it has three roots 1e , 2e  
and 3e . Another solid line is the linear function )(eΦ  represented under the condition that 
zf lhjf ≡< −++ β
β )1)()((
1
2122 , with a root whose value is between 1e  and 2e . The dashed line is the 
representation of the linear function )(eΦ  under the condition zf >1 , with a root whose value is 
between 1e  and 3e .  
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Fig. 1. The case where 0))(( 12122 >−++ flhjf β . 
The cubic function )(eΘ  cuts the vertical axe at a point lower than the linear function )(eΦ  
because: 
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It follows that )(eF  has only one root between zero and unity and two roots above unity. 
Figure 2 represents the case where 04 <e , β
))((
1
2122 lhjff ++>∀ . It contains the cubic line )(eΘ  
and the line )(eΦ  with negative slope. Since these curves have only one intersection point 
between zero and unity, it follows that there are only one positive real solution smaller than unity 
but two complex solutions. 
 36 
 
                                                                                                             )(eΘ  
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                         
 
                                                                                                                                         
                                                 1                                 β
1                                                    
                                                 1e                                2e           3e  
 
 
 
                                                           )(eΦ  
                                           Fig. 2. The case where 0))(( 12122 <−++ flhjf β . 
To show that the complex solutions have a real part greater than unity, we denote the unique 
real solution by *e . Then, the function )(eF  is decomposed as follows 
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Since the coefficient associated with 2e  is unity and the composite coefficient associated with e  
is greater than two, it follows that the real part of complex solutions is greater than unity. ■ 
